Security remediation — qualification

Record status

Record ID

project:security-remediation

Parent lifecycle

candidate

Page lane

qualification

Lane lifecycle

proposed

Owner

Not separately recorded

Owner role

Not separately recorded

Owner status

Not separately recorded

Qualification result

NOT RUN · held for evidence and human review

Working browser surface: Project templates & workflows — overview — Create a local project from this template and validate its forms. This route is local-only; provider, credential, database, customer, publication, deployment, and production effects remain held.

Qualification status

Result

NOT RUN

Disposition

HELD

Reviewer

Not recorded

Receipt

Not recorded

This page defines proposed acceptance criteria for the qualification lane. It does not execute tests, establish compliance, qualify the subject, or authorize an effect.

Outcome definitions

Verified

All stated evidence and acceptance requirements passed for the exact reviewed revision; this still does not authorize deployment or an external effect.

Failed

One or more deterministic acceptance requirements failed with an inspectable reason.

Needs review

Evidence or interpretation is incomplete, conflicting, or awaits an identified human reviewer.

Held

Authority, required evidence, safe execution conditions, or a principal gate is absent.

The current record remains NOT RUN / HELD. These definitions describe candidate outcomes only.

Proposed deterministic acceptance tests

Route-resolution and distinct-content checks apply only to the admitted canonical routes in this record. Held source-proposed extensions are non-resolving proposals and are excluded.

• Submitting without a title, problem statement, source label, scope boundary, owner, or severity is rejected with field-level errors.
• A scope that contains no explicit boundary or includes prohibited production, provider, credential, customer, publication, or database effects is rejected or marked Held.
• An affected asset locator must be source-labelled; unsupported locators cannot be treated as authoritative.
• Every linked evidence record must retain its canonical ID, origin, source locator, provenance, revision, and lifecycle metadata where available.
• A task with a missing owner, invalid date, duplicate dependency, self-dependency, or dependency cycle cannot be saved as ready.
• A verification deadline earlier than its prerequisite task or a review deadline earlier than verification is rejected deterministically.
• Changing an approved plan creates a new revision, preserves the prior revision, and returns the project to Needs review.
• A destructive action requires a plain-language impact warning, explicit confirmation, named authority, rollback or recovery plan, and an approval receipt; cancellation makes no change.
• Deleting a project, evidence record, task, or approval is blocked by default and replaced with a reversible Held or archived disposition; permanent deletion requires separate authority and a second confirmation.
• External sends, provider writes, credential changes, database writes, customer indexing, publication, and production changes remain visibly Held and cannot be represented as completed.
• An authorization failure, unavailable source, malformed attachment, duplicate submission, or save conflict leaves the existing record unchanged and exposes a recoverable error with retry or draft-preservation guidance.
• Concurrent revision conflict requires explicit comparison and user choice; last-write-wins is not acceptable for approved or evidence records.
• Keyboard-only users can reach every field, error, dependency control, confirmation, and status action in a logical order.
• Every input has a persistent accessible label; errors are associated with fields, announced to assistive technology, and not conveyed by color alone.
• Focus moves to the first invalid field after failed submission and remains visible after destructive-action dialogs open.
• Status, severity, deadlines, held effects, and approval state have text equivalents and sufficient contrast.
• Sensitive evidence is minimized, redacted where possible, excluded from public search and public documentation, and never copied into an unbounded message or attachment field.
• Privacy changes require re-review when scope, affected records, evidence, recipients, or visibility changes.
• Only the named owner or delegated authority may approve, close, authorize destructive action, or change the canonical scope; unauthorized attempts are rejected and logged.
• A failed verification cannot produce a closed or approved state; it must produce Needs revision or Held with observed failure evidence.
• A blocked dependency displays the blocking record, owner, reason, and next action; the project remains visibly blocked rather than appearing complete.
• A successful local save produces a canonical record ID and receipt; an uncertain save state is shown as Unknown and must not be duplicated automatically.
• Search results honor visibility and lifecycle boundaries, excluding private, held, and sensitive records from inappropriate views.
• Qualification is never inferred from form completion; the project remains proposal-only until human review and all acceptance criteria are explicitly recorded.

Negative and held-state tests

• Scope creep can turn a bounded investigation into unauthorized production or customer-impacting activity.
• Sensitive evidence may expose credentials, personal data, security details, or private source material.
• A stale or conflicting revision may overwrite approved scope, evidence, deadlines, or rollback instructions.
• Incorrect dependency ordering can cause unsafe remediation or invalid verification.
• A misleading completed status can conceal blocked, failed, or unverified work.
• Destructive actions may be irreversible without explicit authority and recovery planning.
• Provider, credential, database, customer, publication, and production effects may be mistaken for available capabilities because native surfaces are prototypes or indexes.
• Accessibility failures can prevent review, confirmation, or recovery for keyboard and assistive-technology users.
• Public indexing or documentation could disclose vulnerability details or private records.
• Unbounded attachments or hidden uploads could violate custody, retention, or privacy expectations.
• Overreliance on an instrument is unsafe because no verified instrument is necessary or designated for this project type.

Qualification claim boundary

Potentially allowed only after the stated evidence

• This is a proposed template for bounded security-remediation qualification.
• The project design includes scope, authority, provenance, deadlines, dependencies, revisions, accessibility, privacy, and held-effect checks.
• The observed native contract supports local project, task, record, revision, agenda, and approval concepts.

Still held

• Any claim that a security issue was repaired, qualified, deployed, or verified in production.
• Any claim of provider, credential, database, customer, publication, or production connection.
• Any claim that evidence is authoritative, complete, or customer-indexed.
• Any claim that an approval, deadline write, message send, upload, export, or destructive action occurred externally.
• Any claim that the project is secure, closed, or risk-free.

Sources and evidence

These pointers bind the page to evidence. They do not grant authority or collapse verification into deployment.

• source_record:project:security-remediation
• NotebookCollectionKind.project
• NotebookTodoPayload.dueAt
• Notebook Agenda deadlines/workbacks
• Notebook records provenance and revisions
• PointGuard persistent cross-app context surface
• Current GuthHub app routes are local prototypes or indexes and external effects remain held