Email and publishing
Configured-deployment example: the agent may draft while a broker owns the send credential and can withhold delivery before an external service accepts it.
Action security
Chatbots talk. Agents act - send, spend, publish, change. Guth is the checkpoint an action has to pass before it becomes real. Guth security is designed around the moment an AI system tries to do something consequential: send, publish, spend, deploy, unlock, move, or change.
A content filter can object to bad words. An action gateway sits in the execution path and can withhold the credential, capability, or physical enable signal required to make an effect real.
Target design: the agent must state exactly what it wants to do: the action, the target, the data, the tool, and the authority it claims to have.
Target design: the gateway evaluates policy, current state, scope, recipient, credentials, limits, and required approvals.
Target design: low-risk effects may proceed under policy; sensitive effects require a short-lived human or device-bound approval.
Target design: the gateway issues a bounded capability token—or denies, holds, revokes, terminates, and records the attempt.
Circuit-breaker examples
Configured-deployment example: the agent may draft while a broker owns the send credential and can withhold delivery before an external service accepts it.
Configured-deployment example: execution stays inside a governed sandbox whose control plane can terminate the process, revoke its lease, or remove access.
Design requirement: commands use signed, bounded authorization, while a watchdog, safety controller, or hardware interlock—not the language model—owns the final stop path.
Defense in depth
Device-bound approval, handwritten or captured signatures, printable records, unique seals, controlled workstations, and an independent manual cutoff.
Encrypted transfer, credential vaults, brokered APIs, least privilege, short leases, recipient and data classification, immutable event records, and replay controls.
Structured action proposals, deterministic policy gates, bounded capability tokens, pre-commit checks, continuous watchdogs, and deny / hold / terminate states.
The current local surface captures signature strokes only. It does not yet bind a verified signer, device, payload hash, time window, authority policy, or receipt. Those controls must exist before Guth can describe a signature as authorization or issuance.
Approval path
The useful security boundary is not a vague promise that an agent will behave. It is a control point that can freeze the exact proposed effect, ask the right human, and withhold the credential until the decision is valid.
Commit the exact recipient, subject, body, attachments, and source version.
sha256 5f2a…90bdApproval is bound to these bytes and this action. A reusable signature image is not authority.
decision PENDINGThe gateway may release one narrowly scoped capability for the approved recipient and payload.
send capability WITHHELDThe receipt says delivered, rejected, expired, or withheld only after the relevant system proves it.
external effects 0The words matter
The engine can stop only actions routed through a control point it owns. Once an email has been accepted by an external server, code has escaped the sandbox, or a machine accepts unauthenticated commands, reliable prevention is already lost. Guth therefore treats brokered credentials, constrained effectors, and independent fail-safe controls as design requirements—not optional monitoring.